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And Then There Were Two
By MAmJA MATICH HUGHES*
Man and wife are one person, but understand in what manner.
When a small brooke or little river mcorporateth with Rhodanus
or the Thames, the poor rivulet looseth its name, it is carried and
recarried with the new associate, it beareth no sway, it possetheth
nothing during coverture To a married woman, her new
self is her superior, her companion, her master.'
A NAME is a person's identity. It is an individual's link, however
intangible, with his or her ancestral heritage. Traditionally, women
have been demed this small portion of their self-identity. Under
Roman Law, a married woman was merely a possession of her husband
and did not share the family name.' Under English common law and
the feudal doctrine of coverture, "a husband and wife are one
[and] the one is the husband."3  A wife took her husband's name as
notice to the world that her legal existence was "incorporated and con-
solidated into that of [her] husband."4
Today, it is almost a universal rule in this country that upon
marriage, as a matter of law, a wife's surname becomes that of her hus-
band. 5 While a wife may continue to use her maiden name for nu-
merous purposes (professionally, for example), her name as a matter
of public record is that of her husband. In order to legally retain her
maiden name, the wife must go through court proceedings to change
* B.A., 1966 Umversity of Belgrado and Sacramento State College; M.L.S.,
1968, Umversity of Maryland at College Park; Reference Law Libranan, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law; Editor, The Sexual Barrier (1970). The author would like to acknowl-
edge the assistance of Rhonda Mae Gae, Member, Third Year Class, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. Seventeenth century British case, quoted in SISTEsIOOD IS POWERFuL 4 (R.
Morgan ed. 1970).
2. R. SOHM, THE INsTrruTs § 93 (3d ed. J. Ledlie transl. 1907).
3. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
4. 1 W BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
5. E.g., People ex ret. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 111. App. 63, 70, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645
(1945); Chapman v. Phoenix Nat1 Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881); Freeman v. Haw-
kins, 77 Tex. 498, 500, 14 S.W. 364, 365 (1890); HAwAII Rv. STAT. tit. 31, § 574-1
(1968); 1944 NEV. Op. ATr' GEN. 154.
her name back to the one with which she was born.6 Recently, women
have begun to react to this stiuation. As one approach, bills have been
introduced in several state legislatures which would permit a woman
to determine at the time of her marriage whether to retain her maiden
name.7 Variations of this proposal would allow a woman to choose her
mother's maiden name,8 to use a combination of her own name and
that of her husband, 9 or to revert to her maiden name merely by filing
a notice of intent, with no court proceeding necessary. 1°
Although none of the suggested legislation has passed, such pro-
posals represent a significant step that must be taken before sexual dis-
crimination can be completely eliminated. So long as society views
women in terms of their husbands, full equality of the sexes will be
impossible." This article will discuss the constitutional objections to
substituting a husband's name for that of his wife. The oft-men-
tioned difficulties in allowing a wife to retain her maiden name will
6. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1275-79 (West 1955), as amended (West
Supp. 1971).
7. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 729 (1971 Reg. Sess.); Ill. House Bill No. 2210 (77th
Gen. Assembly, 1971); Wash. Senate Bill No. 503 (42d Reg. Sess. 1971); Wis. As-
sembly Bill No. 781 (1969).
8. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 729 (1971 Reg. Sess.).
9. Wash. Senate Bill No. 503 (42d Reg. Sess. 1971).
10. Mass. House Bill No. 4613 (1971).
11. Another form of subtle discrimination and example of defining women by
their relationship with men exists when women are required to disclose their marital
status by Miss or Mrs., while men merely indicate their maleness by the use of Mr.
To relieve this situation, legislation has been introduced which prohibits any "instru-
mentality of the United States from using as a prefix to the name of any person any
title which indicates marital status." H.R. 10121, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Additional legislation before the 92d Congress would eliminate any requirements
that women designate their marital status as a requisite for voting in any federal elec-
tion, if the same disclosure is not required of men. H.R. 4195, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). Currently a number of states require a woman to indicate whether she is a
Miss or a Mrs. before she is permitted to vote. E.g., CAL. ELEc. CODE § 310(b)
(West Supp. 1971). In 1970, Austria took a step toward eliminating speculation
over marital status by passing legislation that all women government employees must
be addressed as "Frau." N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, at 8, col. 1. In France, custom,
not law, dictates that all older women be called "Madame," whatever their marital
status. For a discussion of the increasing tendency in this country to use a single form
of address, Ms., for all women, see NEWSWEEK, April 26, 1971, at 61.
Neither Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15,
nor any State FEP law except New Jersey's, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (1960), bars
discrimination on the basis of marital status. Landau & Dunahoo, Sex Discrimination
in Employment: A Survey of State and Federal Remedies, 20 DRAKE L.R. 417, 478
(1971). But see 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(d) (1971) which prohibits all government con-
tractors and subcontractors from distinguishing between married and unmarried
persons of one sex unless the same distinction is made between married and unmarried
persons of the opposite sex.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 23
be balanced against the stability and clarity of identity that would result.
The Present State of the Law
In our culture, a married woman is expected to take her hus-
band's name. By law she is required to do so in nearly all states.
12
This rule was established early by a fictitious common law doctrine
which recognized a merger between husband and wife upon mar-
riage. 13 The traditional civil law view, on the other hand, was that the
wife retained her maiden name as her legal name and bore her hus-
band's name only as a matter of custom.'
4
The 1931 Louisiana case of Succession of Kneipp'5 followed the
civil law approach. The testatrix's marriage license to her second
husband bore her maiden name rather than the name of her first
husband. The court held that this did not tend to prove that her first
marriage was invalid. However, the most recent Louisiana case in
point, Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Committee,'6 ap-
parently abandoned the civil law approach and instead adopted that
of the common law without reference to the earlier decision. Laura
Wilty was a candidate for Assessor of Jefferson Parish as an opponent
of the incumbent, her husband, Vernon Wilty. It was the position of
Vernon Wilty, the plaintiff, that his wife's correct legal name was "Mrs.
Laura Verret Wilty," and not "Mrs. Vernon J. Wilty, Jr.," the name
under which his wife had qualified as a candidate. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana agreed and ordered the wife recertified under her Christian
name and her husband's surname.
The only common law state showing any deviation from the normal
rule is Ohio. In State ex rel. Krupa v. Green'7 a prominent woman
attorney was permitted to run for the office of Judge of the Cleveland
Municipal Court under her maiden name. The court noted that the can-
didate was well known in the area under her maiden name, that she
had signed an antenuptial agreement with her husband by which they
mutually agreed that she would continue to use her maiden name,
that upon marriage she notified the Board of Elections of her intention
to retain her maiden name, and that previous to the suit she had al-
ready voted and run for public office under her maiden name, although
12. See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
13. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMNTARIEs *442-44.
14. M. PLAINOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIR DE Daorr CVIL, No. 513 (4e &. 1948).
15. 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931).
16. 245 La. 145, 157 So. 2d 718 (1963).
17. 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
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she was married. The court concluded:
It is only by custom, in English speaking countries, that a woman,
upon marriage, adopts the surname of her husband in place of the
surname of her father. The State of Ohio follows this custom, but
there exists no law compelling it.
18
A statute19 which provided that when a person changes his name "by
marriage or otherwise . . . such elector is required to register under
the new name before he will be eligible to vote" was held inapplica-
ble2° as the court was of the opinion that the candidate had not changed
her name upon marriage. 2
In sharp contrast to Krupa is the holding of an Illinois court in a
case involving a Chicago woman attorney. The court, in People ex rel.
Rago v. Lipsky,22 held that the provisions of the Illinois Election Code 23
providing that "any registered voter who changes his or her name by
marriage or otherwise, shall be required to register anew" were man-
datory.24 The plaintiff had filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
to compel the Board of Elections to permit her to vote under her
maiden name, notwithstanding her subsequent marriage. Although the
plaintiff had her husband's express approval to continue using her maiden
name, the writ was denied. The court concluded:
[The election statute] expressly recognizes a change of name by
marriage . . . . [I]t must logically follow that when the Legisla-
ture expressly referred to the fact that the name of a registered voter
might be changed by marriage it had in mind the long-established
custom, policy and rule of the common law among English-speaking
peoples whereby a woman's name is changed by marriage and
her husband's surname becomes as a matter of law her surname.2 5
The common law does recognize the right of a person to acquire
another name simply by using it consistently.26 Statutory procedures
by which one may change his or her name are merely for recording pur-
poses and do not abrogate the right to change one's name without le-
gal proceedings.2 7 Yet many states have made married women excep-
18. Id. at 501, 177 N.E.2d at 619.
19. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3503.18 (Page 1960).
20. 114 Ohio App. at 502, 177 N.E.2d at 620.
21. Id.
22. 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 6-54 (1969).
24. 327 Ill. App. at 75, 63 N.E.2d at 647.
25. Id. at 70, 63 N.E.2d at 645 (emphasis added).
26. E.g., In re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); Reinker v. Reinker,
351 Il. 409, 410, 184 N.E. 639, 640 (1933); In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N.Y.S.
616 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
27. E.g., In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 726, 96 P.2d 958, 960 (1939);
In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N.Y.S. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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tions to the rule. The election statute involved in the Lipsky case is one
example.2 8  Another was the refusal to issue a certificate of naturali-
zation in the In re Kayaloff case.29 Despite the fact that the applicant
was a musician well known professionally by her maiden name, the
federal district court would permit issuance of the certificate only in
the surname of her husband. The court relied heavily on the New
York case of Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank.30 Yet that case in-
volved a woman seeking to have confiscation proceedings set aside
because they were conducted under her maiden name. The plaintiff
argued not that she had adopted her maiden name through consist-
ent use, but that the proceedings were invalid because she had been de-
prived of all notice.3 The California Elections Code requires one regis-
tering to vote who has changed his name within one year of such
registration to state the fact in the affidavit of registration, but the
statute specifically excludes change of name by marriage. 2 When an
elector changes his name after registration, the code declares that the
elector "may reregister under his new or changed name."33 The statute
is clearly permissive, not mandatory. Also, the California Vehicle Code
prohibits the use of false or fictitious names on drivers licenses, or in
the registration of motor vehicles,34 but places no restrictions on a woman
who wishes to consistently use her maiden name. Certain professional
and vocational regulations require compliance with specific name
change procedures but that is a part of their licensing function.3 5 While
it appears that the logic of the Ohio Krupa case could be used to argue
that the vocational regulations should not apply-since when a woman
28. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 46, § 6-54 (1969). The Attorney General of Nevada
interpreted a similar Nevada statute as follows: "Under NRS 293.517, which pro-
vides the manner of registering the name of married female electors and requires
change of name of registration upon change of name, and NRS 293,177, which re-
quires a declaration of candidacy to include an averment of registration, married
women must file as a candidate using her own given name and her husband's surname,
but may insert her maiden name for identification." 1966 NEv. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 311.
29. 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
30. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881).
31. Id. at 440 (appellants statement of the case).
32. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 214 (West 1961).
33. Id. § 215.
34. CAL. VYE. CODE § 4750, 12809(d) (West 1971). A fictitious name is one
used to describe an individual in only one phase of his or her life. See Ray v. Ameri-
can Photo Player Co., 46 Cal. App. 311, 314, 189 P. 130, 131 (1920).
35. CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 16, § 310 (1970) (chiropracteric); CAL. ADM. CODE,
tit. 16, § 512.5 (1971) (dry cleaning); CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 16, § 1348 (medicine,
with specific provisions for change of name by marriage); CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 16,
§ 1917 (1970) (pest control); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4094 (West 1962) (phar-
macy); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1654 (West 1962) (dentistry).
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consistently uses the one name she was born with there is no change of
name-any woman planning to retain her maiden name would be
wise to comply with statutory change of name proceedings. 6 The re-
sulting court order is of particular value when a married woman must
deal with a governmental agency reluctant to accept her maiden
name.
37
It has been declared that the courts should encourage the filing
of petitions for change of name, so that these changes can become a
matter of public record.3" Statutory proceedings have been held to be
merely "in aid and affirmance" 39 of the common law rule, with the
advantage of being speedy and definite. 4°  Thus, the general rule is
that some substantial reason or peculiar circumstance must exist before
the court is justified in denying an application for a change of name.4"
One justification is that the change would be detrimental to the inter-
ests of another person.4" In Massachusetts, no name change will be
granted unless "for a sufficient reason consistent with public interest. 41 3
Whether such exceptions to the general rule could be used to pre-
vent a married woman from retaining her maiden name over the objec-
tions of her husband is not known since no cases dealing directly
with this point could be found.44  In one recent California case, a
wife challenged the trial judge's arbitrary ruling that she needed her
husband's written consent in order to change her name through court
proceedings; but, in the face of the challenge, the judge retreated
36. There is considerable doubt whether the common law rule would apply over
the objection of a married woman's husband. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE
LAW 43 (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANowrrz].
37. See text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
38. In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 727, 96 P.2d 958, 961 (1939).
39. In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N.Y.S. 616, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1932), quoting
Laflin & Rand Power Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 442, 23 A. 215, 217 (1892);
accord, In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 726, 96 P.2d 958, 960 (1939).
40. See authorities cited in note 39 supra.
41. in re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Kastenbaum, 44 N.Y.S.2d
2 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
42. Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 312, 114 A.2d 203, 205 (1955); Reinken v.
Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 413, 184 N.E. 639, 640 (1933); In re Wing, 4 Misc. 2d 840,
157 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. City Ct. 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-1 (1963).
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 12 (1958).
44. Kanowitz is of the opinion that under statutes such as those existing in
Colorado or Ohio a court would refuse to change a married woman's surname if her
husband objected. KANOWlTZ, supra note 36, at 44. But see Converse v. Converse,
30 S.C. Eq. 535 (1856) where the court declared a wife may change her name against
the wishes of her husband, but rejected the application since the husband and wife
were separated and to grant the application would, in the court's opinion, close the door
to reconciliation.
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from his earlier position and the woman was allowed to change her
name without the issue being decided.4" A number of states ex-
pressly prohibit a married woman from having a surname different from
her husband's.40 In those states, a wife's surname can be formally




In all states, a woman is subjected to the expenses of filing fees,
probable attorney's fees, and court appearances, merely to assert a
right that is her husband's automatically-the right to retain her own
name after marriage. Recent, proposed legislation would do much to
ease her burden.
A bill introduced in the 1969 Wisconsin Assembly, later vetoed by
the governor, was especially well-worded. It read as follows:
(1) Any woman named on a marriage license may, at the time
the license is issued, elect to retain her maiden name or an-
other permissible previous name. Such election shall be
made in writing and signed by her on a form provided un-
der S. 245.20 and shall be attached to the copy of the mar-
riage license retained by the county clerk.
(2) A name retained by a women under the section shall be that
woman's name for all legal purposes including business af-
fairs and elections to public offices.
48
Another proposed bill, introduced in the State of Washington,
would permit a married woman to use some combination of her
own and her husband's name.49 It would also permit either or both
of the spouses to choose as their legal names "any name he, she, or
they wish to be known by . . . ."I' This last subsection would have
been an unfortunate addition to the laws of Washington. Without
45. In re Camera, No. 125025 (Super. Ct. Cal., July 2, 1971).
46. "Every married woman shall adopt her husband's name as a family name."
HAwAn REv. STAT., tit. 31, § 574-1 (1968). "Any person, under no civil disabilities,
who has attained his or her majority and is unmarried, if a female, desiring to change
his or her name, may do so as provided in this chapter." IowA CODE ANN. § 674.1
(1950) (emphasis added). "Any person at least eighteen years of age, who is not a
married woman, may have his name changed by the county court of the county in
which he resides." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 401.010 (1969) (emphasis added).
47. Iowa expressly recognizes this natural implication of her statute by the fol-
lowing language: "The surname of such new name shall become the legal surname of
the wife and minor children of such person." IowA CoDa ANN. § 674.10 (1950).
This is the general rule in this country. KANowrrz, supra note 36, at 45; 1 THE CAru-
FORN A FAMILY LAWYER § 9.12, at 324 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed., 1962).
48. Wis. Assembly Bill No. 781 (1969).
49. Wash. Senate Bill No. 503, § 1 (42d Reg. Sess. 1971).
50. Id. § 2.
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO HER NAMENovember 19711
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the safeguards of a court proceeding, a couple could choose any name
they desired and could, with impunity, deliberately capitalize on the
name of some eminent person.
A bill very similar to the Wisconsin bill has been introduced into
the 1971 California Assembly." It significantly departs from the Wis-
consin bill at two points. First, the proposed addition to the California
Civil Code would permit a woman to employ her mother's maiden name
as her legal name upon marriage.5 2  Secondly, any unmarried per-
son upon attaining the age of 21 could elect to bear the maiden name
of his or her mother.53
A proposal before the Massachusetts legislature takes a slightly dif-
ferent tack. That bill would permit a woman to use her maiden name
for all legal purposes simply by filing a notice of intent to do so."
The proposed Massachusetts legislation has the advantage of allowing a
woman the option of reverting to her maiden name at any time after her
marriage. The decision need not be made at the time she signs the
marriage license.
The most poorly worded proposal relating to the choice of a name
by a married woman was introduced in the Illinois Assembly. It read as
follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Illinois or federal stat-
ute, a married woman may choose to continue to use her maiden
name, may use her husband's name or may adopt any other name,
and may use the name so chosen for all legal purposes. 55
The bill was subject to two interpretations. As has already been seen,
the common law rule permited one to use any name he or she chose, so
long as the name was used consistently and was not detrimental to the in-
terests of anyone else. 6 Since that common law rule has been adopted
in the United States, subject to certain statutory exceptions,57 the Illi-
nois proposal adds nothing. If, however, one's interpretation was that
the legislation would somehow expand the common law rule then it
would be clearly discriminatory against single women and men. To
51. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 729 (1971 Reg. Sess.).
52. Id. § 1(a).
53. Id. § 1(b).
54. Mass. House Bill No. 4613 (1971).
55. Ill. House Bill No. 4613 (1971).
56. See text accompanying notes 26, 41-43 supra.
57. E.g., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 69, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645
(1945) which involved the Illinois election statute exception to the common law rule,
declared: "There is nothing . . . in any of the Illinois cases which indicates any lack
of adherence by Illinois courts to the established principles of the long and well-settled
common law."
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formally change their names, they would have to resort to court proceed-
ings, while married women could legally choose "any" name they
wished.
The Objection to Change
In his message vetoing the bill which would have permitted a
married woman to retain her maiden name, the governor of Wisconsin
summarized many of the current objections to such proposals.
To my knowledge, this legislation is unique. Both by custom
and legally, since the time of Edward IV, the wife has taken her
husband's surname as her own.
Our property, commercial and domestic relations law is based
on this premise. The enactment of this legislation would necessi-
tate alteration of law, legal forms, contracts and data processing
procedures. It could lead to practical difficulties in landlord and
tenant relations, service of papers, determination of claim of title
and ability of law enforcement agencies to determine the wherea-
bouts of individuals.
58
Although these historical and legal traditions which dictate that a
married woman must take her husband's surname are based on notions
that are repugnant to us today, the traditions continue. The question
which must be answered is whether out-moded concepts of male domi-
nance have become so entrenched in our society that it would be un-
duly burdensome to eliminate them. The objections raised are similar
in theme to those raised by opponents of integration, so the answer
may be found in the same framework, that of equal protection. Courts
have begun to recognize sex as a suspect criterion,59 so the re-
maining issue is whether states have a "compelling interest" in requir-
ing a woman to use her husband's surname upon marriage. 0°
Governmental Interests Involved
Most of the limitations on a person's right to change his or her
name, whether imposed by common law or added by statutes, have
been designed to protect and safeguard other people. For instance,
statutes provide strict procedures for the attorney6 or the physician62
who wishes to change his or her name; in business, true ownership
58. Wisc. LEGISLATIVE FERENCE BUREAU, BULL. No. 70-3, THE 1969 ExEcu-
rvn VEroEs iN WiscoNsiN, 24 (1970).
59. United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968); Sailer Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971).
60. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 296.36 (1958).
62. See, e.g., CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 16, § 1348 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 296.36
(1958).
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must be determinable to prevent fraud of creditors;63 in the interests of
safety on its highways, a state may require that all drivers who
change their names by marriage or otherwise, notify the states;64 and,
in order to further the free alienability of property, a state may require
that records of a name change be attached to the conveyance of
any property. 6
Records of name changes are needed not only for the protection
of others, but also to aid in the smooth functioning of governmental
administrative agencies. The modern bureaucracy requires an uninter-
rupted record of the identification of each of its citizens. Would the
right of a married woman to maintain her maiden name after marriage
in all affairs interfere with either the protection or recording functions
of government? The answer is clearly no. If a woman consistently
uses the one name with which she was born, there would be no prob-
lems. The woman would hold herself out to the public, commercially
and professionally, as the same person for her entire life. Creditors
would in no way be decieved; title of ownership would be easily traced
since the name of the woman remains the same even after marriage;
and state licensing regulations requiring that the licensee notify the state
upon the change of name would not really be applicable since there
would be no name change.
The ultimate means of identification under the federal bureauc-
racy is the social security account number.6 6 That number remains
constant throughout a person's life. Name changes are routinely ac-
cepted by the Social Security Administration office so long as the
new name corresponds to the name used in employment.67 With the
advent of data processing, everyone has been assigned a number.
Rather than making it more difficult for a married woman to retain
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 209 § 10 (1958) specifically provides that when
a woman does business under a name other than her husband's she must complete a
certificate and pay a fee. "[T]he statute was intended to allow creditors to gain
information as to title so that they could regulate the mercantile transactions accord-
ingly; thus the statute was intended solely to regulate the affairs of husband and wife
with respect to creditors." 1966 MASS. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 40.
64. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-4-17 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.19 (1968).
65. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT REV. § 47-13 (1958) provides: "Any married woman
who conveys property acquired prior to her marriage shall state in the instrument of
conveyance the name under which she acquired such property, and the town clerk
shall index the record of such instrument in the name under which such property was
acquired and in the name under which it was transferred."
66. E.g., the social security account number is identical to an employee's tax-
payer identification number. 5A CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5229.03.
67. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1242(b) (1971) with Social Security Administra-
tion Form OAAN-7003 (1-67).
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her maiden name, as was suggested by the governor of Wisconsin,68
computerization makes such a choice more practical than was pre-
viously possible.
The Names of Children
The chief obstacle which prevents a married woman from retain-
ing her maiden name concerns what name the children shall take. A
father is generally held to have a protectible interest in having the chil-
dren bear his surname, even after divorce actions where custody of the
children has been awarded to the mother.6 9 A father will be deprived
of his "natural ' 70 or "primary" 71 rights only if his misconduct is
sufficiently great to forfeit his right to object,72 or if the benefit to
the child from having his name changed substantially outweighs the
"natural" rights of the father.73  Nearly all cases granting name changes
are decided on the basis of the father's misconduct or neglect of his chil-
dren, since benefit to the children is difficult to prove.74  Mere embar-
rassment, convenience, or sentiment generally bear no weight in deter-
mining the child's best interest.75 Furthermore, the courts have adopted
the principle that "the best interest of a child is usually not served
if the change of name contributes to a further estrangement from his
father who desires to preserve the parental relationship." 6
68. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
69. Worms v. Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 134-35, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1967);
King v. Newman, 421 S.W.2d 149, 150-51 (Tex. 1967); both citing 53 A.L.R.2d 914,
915 (1957).
70. Worms v. Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 135, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1967);
In re Baldini, 17 Misc. 2d 195, 183 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (N.Y. City Ct. 1959); King v.
Newman, 421 S.W.2d 141, 151 (Ct. of Civ. App. Tex. 1967).
71. it re Larson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 262, 183 P.2d 688, 690 (1947).
72. In re Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1022, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966)
(father convicted of murder declared civilly dead); In re Almosnino, 204 Misc. 53, 122
N.Y.S.2d 277 (N.Y. City Ct. 1952) (father showed indifference to son by failing to
visit him over four year period, although boy hospitalized twice); In re Proman,
63 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. City Ct. 1946) (nonsupport and father visited child only once
in eight years).
73. Worms v. Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 135, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1967).
74. See cases cited in note 72 supra. But see In re Epstein, 121 Misc. 151,
200 N.Y.S. 897 (N.Y. City Ct. 1923), holding that even though father deserted family,
mother still had to show benefit to child by change of name.
75. Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562 (C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1953); In re
Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 200 N.Y.S. 897 (N.Y. City Ct. 1923). But see Binford v. Reid,
83 Ga. App. 280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951); In re Rothstein, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 665
(1962).
76. King v. Newman, 421 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ct. of Civ. App. Tex. 1967), citing
Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (Ch. 1963) and Mark v.
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Thus, there is definite precedent in divorce law condoning dif-
ferent surnames for a child and his or her natural mother, even though
that child may live with the mother. Courts have concluded that
a father's parental rights in most instances outweigh any embarrass-
ment that might flow to a child. At least one court has suggested
that if there is any embarrassment in the situation it is probably directed
at the mother rather than the child. 77 A married woman, in enforcing
her right to her own name, should be free to willingly accept any em-
barrassment that might result from having a child with a different
surname. Actually, any embarrassment would be slight, especially for
the child, if the father remains in the household.
Another solution would be to allow the child, once it reaches
the age of volition, to choose its own name. Such a change could
be accomplished through court proceedings when the child is old
enough to petition on his or her own behalf, 78 or through the common
law right to change one's name by adopting another. 79  When no mini-
mum age to petition for a name change is provided, or the common
law method is -used, courts must be convinced that the proposed change
"is really an expression of the child's volition . . . and not just a prod-
uct of maternal influence.
80
A third way of dealing with the problem is to give the child a
surname that is a combination of the names of both parents. This is
the traditional method of assigning surnames in Spain. There, is how-
ever, strong dictum in at least one California case that the father's
protectible interest in his child's surname means that it shall be unadul-
terated by hyphens or combinations with other names.
81
No solution regarding the children's surname is completely satis-
factory. On the whole, the difficulties encountered by a married
woman with children who retains her maiden name are small com-
pared to the difficulties of a divorced woman with custody of children
who bear a different surname. The law has accepted the latter situation
Kahn, 131 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1956) and In re Shipley, 26 Misc. 2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d
581 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
77. In re Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 151-52, 200 N.Y.S. 897 (N.Y. City Ct. 1923).
78. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-601 (1956) (16 years); CAL. CODE CIrV.
PROC. § 1276 (West Supp. 1971) (male: 21 years, female: 18 years); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-5-1 (1954) (14 years).
79. Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 N.J. Super. 350, 79 A.2d 497 (Ch. 1951) (the com-
mon law right of change available to minors as well as adults). But see Trower v.
Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 77, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1968).
80. 44 CORNELL L.Q. 144, 149 (1958).
81. Trower v. Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 78, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875 (1968).
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through the doctrine of the father's "natural right." Ideally the law
should abandon that doctrine and accept the proposition that the sur-
name of a child should represent a process of agreement between
mother and father. Until that time, women will have to accept differ-
ent surnames than their children if they wish to maintain their maiden
names.
Benefits to the Married Woman
The consistency of identity that would develop if women were per-
mitted to retain their maiden names after marriage would more than
outweigh any incident complexities that might develop. The sense of
pride one develops in one's name would not be lost upon marriage. More
importantly, self-identity would be retained even in divorce. In a
majority of jurisdictions, when a woman is granted a divorce, the
courts may upon request restore her maiden name or the name of a
previous husband."2 It is generally discretionary with the courts whether
the woman's request will be granted."'
Statutes in a number of states expressly deny courts the power to
make a name change in divorce cases under certain circumstances. For
instance, in some states a court is permitted to restore a wife's maiden
name only when she successfully brought the divorce action and was not
the defendant.8 4 Kanowitz states the following about such statutes:
In addition to other penalties for her misconduct leading to her hus-
band's divorce, [the wife] is "punished" by being required to bear
her husband's name until she remarries and thus submerges that
name in that of a new husband.8 5
Another group of states discriminates against the divorced women seek-
ing restoration of her maiden name by granting such requests only
when there are no minor children from the marriage, 8 or when the
wife is not given custody of the children. 7 Wisconsin contains the
82. E.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (1956); CoNN. GN. STAT. REV. § 46-
21 (1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1225 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.130 (1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.100 (1969). In California, the court in a divorce proceeding
may restore a wife's maiden or former name without any request by the wife. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 4362 (West Supp. 1971).
83. See authorities cited in note 82 supra.
84. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-121 (1969); MAss. GnN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 23
(1958); MliNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.27 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.100 (1952);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 557 (1958).
85. KANowrrz, supra note 36, at 44.
86. Mic. CoaM. LAws ANN. § 552.391 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-23
(Supp. 1971).
87. S.D. COMmE LAws ANN. § 25-4-47 (1967); WIp. STAT. ANN, § 247.20
(Supp. 1971).
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unique statutory restriction that a wife will be permitted to resume
her maiden name only if she receives no alimony.8 8 Thus a divorced
woman is forced to make a choice between a basic right afforded her
by statute, and the even more fundamental one of using the name
with which she was born. These restrictive statutes reflect a blatant
sexual bias. Needless to say, if a woman had been permitted to retain
her maiden name throughout the marriage, she would not be of-
fended by a discriminatory statute, nor be required to rely on the
discretion of a judge. 89
Solutions
Currently, married women are denied the fundamental right to con-
tinue using the name with which they were born, with which they
grew up, and with which they formed their identity. Three solutions
to this situation exist.
First, judical proceedings for the purpose of changing one's name
should be made available to all women. The lack of any compelling
state interest in having a married woman bear her husband's surname
clearly dictates that the judicial procedure for name changes be made
equally available to wife and husband. Any state statute which pro-
hibits a married woman from taking a different name than her husband,
or conditions her right to change her name on her husband's consent,
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, state legislatures should enact legislation giving a married
woman the option of retaining her maiden name without going
through any court proceeding. No state should use the excuse of admin-
istrative convenience to defeat such legislation. Once the advantages
of permitting a married woman to retain her maiden name are fully
recognized, the difficulties in such proposals seem slight.
The third solution would be for courts to abandon the whole
social and legal tradition which declares that upon marriage a wife's
legal name becomes that of her husband. If the courts were to de-
clare that a married woman has a constitutional right to use her maiden
88. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.20 (Supp. 1971).
89. A great many women continue to use their husband's names for the sake of
convenience, and to avoid embarrassment. They faced an identification crisis and
loss of personality when they changed their names at the time of marriage and would
prefer not to go through the ordeal again. Divorce is a traumatic situation for a
woman. It is coupled with the loss of one's marital partner, disruption of family life,
status, and "station in life." Thus the additional burden of reverting to her maiden
name may be too much for a woman to bear.
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name for any legal purpose, 90 the civil law view would come close to be-
ing adopted. Without the aid of legislation or court proceedings a mar-
ried woman would be free to consistently use her maiden name for all
purposes so long as neither fraud nor deceit were involved. It is too
late in history to argue that all women should be required to use their
maiden names as their legal names and bear their married names
only as a matter of custom. Too many women would want to con-
tinue using their husband's surname for all purposes. But if a mar-
ried woman continues to use her maiden name in all her affairs,
it can be forcefully argued that she has not changed her name at
all. No one is deceived by such an arrangement. In fact, the opposite
is true. A woman's public identity would remain constant. The rec-
ognition of a married woman's constitutional right to retain her maiden
name would represent a momentous advance in the struggle for her sepa-
rate identity.
90. Such a contention was recently rejected by a federal district court. The
plaintiff sought an injunction to compel Alabama state officials to issue her a driver's
license in her maiden name. The injunction was denied on the basis that "the administra-
tive inconvenience and cost of a change far [outweighed] the harm caused." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
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